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Abstract 
This article adds to the regulatory compliance literature through the theoretical 
development and experimental testing of two endogenous audit mechanisms that use 
contemporaneous relative comparisons, based on disclosed information or imperfect 
signals of compliance effort, to generate a compliance competition among agents. This 
type of audit mechanism has some advantages over the more widely studied dynamic 
audit mechanisms that condition an agent’s audit probability on past compliance, and 
provides an alternative explanation for the stylized fact, in many settings, that most 
agents are compliant most of the time even though audit rates and expected penalties 
are low. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Amid the political realities of limited enforcement budgets and caps on penalties, a 
fundamental issue for regulators is how best to apply scarce audit resources to 
maximize compliance. As a collateral result, the agency wishes to productively select for 
audit the economic agents that are most noncompliant. This suggests employing an 
endogenous, rather than a random, audit mechanism. The related economics literature, 
the recent focus of which is on pollution regulation and tax compliance, has advocated 
the use of dynamic enforcement mechanisms that use information obtained through an 
audit to assign the agent’s probability of back or future audits (Landsberger and 
Meilijson, 1982; Rickard, Russell, and Howroyd, 1982; Greenberg, 1984; Harrington, 
1988; Harford, 1991; Alm, Cronshaw, and McKee, 1993; Raymond, 1999; Friesen, 
2003; Stafford, 2008; Liu and Neilson, 2009). This literature has taken the view that 
static audit mechanisms are intrinsically less effective. For example, Harrington (1988) 
writes, “In a static analysis there is no way for the agency and the firm to react to each 
other’s actions.” Further, this literature asserts that dynamic audit models provide a 
better explanation for the compliance “puzzle,” the stylized fact that actual compliance 
rates are high even though audit rates and expected penalties are low (see Alm and 
McKee, 1998; Harrington, 1988). Our article takes an alternative position, namely that 
(static) competitive endogenous audit mechanisms based on relative evaluation 
generate strong incentives for compliance and may provide a better explanation for the 
compliance puzzle. 
 
Many regulations require agents to disclose information, where such disclosure will 
ultimately lead to increased costs, such as the levels of activities that are subject to 
taxation, or report information that may cause a negative market reaction. In health and 
safety regulation, firms are required to report work-related illnesses and injuries. In tax 
regulation, earners report their income through tax returns. Other regulations require 
agents to take costly actions, and the regulator can obtain a (imperfect) signal on 
compliance effort. For example, in the context of pollution regulation, there are data 
from air and water quality monitors. In the context of tax compliance, an individual’s tax 
return can be compared to those within a peer group. In this article, noting that the 
regulator often has information from which to contemporaneously compare the relative 
compliance of agents, we model two audit mechanisms that implement a competition 
among agents to achieve higher levels of predicted compliance than random audits. 
The implications of the theory are tested using controlled laboratory experiments. 
 
We frame our theory in the context of an environmental regulation setting where firms 
are required to disclose information on pollution, such as the case with the Toxics 
Release Inventory. However, these mechanisms apply more broadly, and we discuss 
the circumstances where they could apply to enforcement of regulations requiring 
actions such as pollution abatement. In contrast to many articles in the related literature, 
compliance effort (level of disclosure, abatement, etc.) is a continuous choice variable. 
The other key characteristics of our enforcement models are that audits are imperfect 
and that the regulator can, imperfectly, compare behavior among a group of peer firms 
and select for audit those firms that appear most likely to be noncompliant. 
 
Our model assumes only that the regulator is able to make the probability a firm is 
audited depend to some degree on its compliance effort relative to its peers. Also, 
similar to Evans, Gilpatric, and Liu (2009), we model audits as imperfect, which implies 
that firm effort reduces at the margin the expected penalty conditional on being audited. 
Effort is also motivated through competition among firms to avoid being selected for an 
audit. This gives rise to a game that can be characterized as either a form of 
tournament (Lazear and Rozen, 1981) or relative performance evaluation. We show that 
this can yield economically significantly greater compliance effort than with purely 
random audits, and we discuss some significant advantages this type of endogenous 
auditing has relative to auditing based on compliance history. Induced competition of 
the sort we model may be an important reason for high compliance in the presence of a 
low audit frequency and small fines for noncompliance. In the equilibrium of the game, 
high levels of compliance are predicted even in some circumstances where purely 
random audits would yield zero compliance effort. These circumstances are expanded if 
being audited is itself a costly event for a firm. 
 
Our tournament audit mechanism represents an interesting twist on standard 
tournament models, which have been used extensively to study behavior in the labor 
market, sporting contests, and the practice of law. In our application to compliance, the 
level of disclosure affects not only who gets audited but compliance costs conditional 
upon being audited (e.g., penalties for misreporting). This differs from the standard 
model where the level of effort only affects who wins but not the amount of the prize 
upon winning. The model developed here may be adapted to study behavior in other 
settings where payoffs are rank dependent but prizes are not fixed. This is generally 
true when agents compete to win an opportunity with a value that depends on the 
quality of the winning entry. Examples include advertising agencies competing to win a 
firm’s contract and many types of research tournaments. Even a singing contest where 
the winner receives a recording contract appears to fit this description. 
 
Alm, Cronshaw, and McKee (1993) and Cason and Gangadharan (2006) argue for the 
use of laboratory experiments for investigating regulatory compliance theories given the 
paucity of reliable and available field data. Using an experimental design that allows 
identification of the effects of changing the audit probability, fixed audit cost, and 
marginal penalty, we broadly confirm the comparative statics of the theory. Further, the 
competitive endogenous audit mechanisms induce significantly higher compliance 
rates, and lower variation in compliance rates, than random audit regimes. In contrast, 
three previous experimental studies related to dynamic audits provide mixed evidence. 
Alm, Cronshaw, and McKee (1993) find that random audits result in higher compliance 
than do dynamic, “forward-looking” tax audits. Clark, Friesen, and Muller (2004) find that 
the mechanisms proposed by Harrington (1988) and Friesen (2003) lead to compliance 
rates that are no higher than random audits, although they increase audit efficiency. 
Cason and Gangadharan (2006) find moderate support for the theoretical predictions of 
Harrington’s model, but do not include random audits as a comparative baseline. 
 
 
 
2. Models 
We frame our theory in the context of a regulation requiring disclosure of an activity 
which we will call the level of emissions. Later in this section, we discuss the 
applicability of these models to enforcement of regulations requiring actions such as 
pollution abatement. Disclosure of emissions is assumed to have a constant marginal 
cost, which could result from an emissions tax, but also could incorporate other costs 
such as those emanating from a negative market reaction. An audited firm pays a 
marginal penalty on emissions determined by the audit to have been unreported, and 
this penalty is assumed to be at least as high as the unit cost of disclosed emissions. 
The penalty represents any regulatory fines imposed, but again also may entail other 
costs to the firm of being found noncompliant with the disclosure requirement. Actual 
emissions e are exogenously determined; firms choose only how much to disclose. 
Audits are subject to error in quantifying a firm’s emissions such that an audit reveals 
emissions of e + t , with t being drawn from the distribution F(t ), which is assumed to 
have positive density f (t ) on the interval [a, b]. Note that we impose little structure on 
the distribution of audit errors at this point. If audit errors are one sided (meaning an 
audit cannot reveal emissions in excess of those actually emitted, so errors involve only 
failure to detect emissions), then a < 0 and b = 0. If audits yield an unbiased estimate of 
emissions, then E[t ] = 0.We will assume a > −e so that an audit cannot reveal negative 
emissions. We use the following notation:  
 
α the cost to a firm of disclosed emissions (“tax”)  
β the cost to a firm of revealed undisclosed emissions (“penalty”) 
γ the cost to a firm of being audited 
e a firm’s quantity of emissions 
q the quantity of emissions a firm chooses to disclose 
 
We first describe firms’ optimal disclosure choices under a random audit enforcement 
mechanism, and then develop two endogenous audit models. Both competitive 
endogenous mechanisms assume that the regulator compares firms’ reported 
emissions and is more likely to audit a firm that fails to disclose more of its emissions. 
The first model, which we term a “tournament” mechanism because it is essentially a 
variant of the seminal Lazear and Rosen (1981) rank-order tournament game, assumes 
the regulator has a fixed audit capacity and therefore audits a certain number of firms, 
which is common knowledge. The second model is somewhat more general because it 
assumes simply that the firm’s audit probability is a function of the difference between 
its degree of noncompliance and that of its peers. Although the probability each firm is 
audited depends on relative disclosure, whether each firm is audited is a result of an 
independent draw, which implies the regulator does not have fixed audit capacity. We 
term this the generalized relative evaluation (GRE) model. Models of this sort, where 
players’ payoffs depend on the absolute difference between their effort and the average 
effort of competitors rather than rank, have received much less attention than rank-order 
tournaments, but Knoeber and Thurman (1994) discuss both types of models in the 
context of broiler (chicken) production. 
 
Random audit mechanism. Suppose a firm is simply audited at random with 
probability p which is independent of whether other firms are audited. Employing a 
standard enforcement framework similar to that developed in Evans, Gilpatric, and Liu 
(2009), firm i chooses the optimal quantity of emissions to disclose to minimize its 
expected costs 
 
(1a)    
 
So long as an interior solution exists, the optimal extent of over-/underreporting of 
emissions is independent of the actual quantity of emissions, and depends only on the 
regulatory parameters α, β, and p and on the distribution of audit errors F(t ). Define zi 
≡ qi − ei, so a negative z represents underreporting whereas a positive value 
represents overreporting. The reporting choice can then be restated as 
 
(1b)    
 
The optimal choice of disclosure, z∗ i , is implicitly defined by 
 
(2)    
 
Under random audits, an interior solution exists for z∗ i on the interval [a, b] if 0 < α pβ 
< 1, with z∗ i defined by (2) above. For α > pβ it is not optimal to report any emissions, 
so a corner solution at qi = 0 obtains.3 At an interior solution, the firm’s optimal report is 
decreasing in the reporting cost, increasing in the probability of audit, and increasing in 
the penalty on revealed but unreported units (these results follow directly from the fact 
that F is an increasing function of zi ). The solution is independent of the cost of being 
audited, γ . The characteristics of the enforcement regime determine the optimal extent 
of over- or underreporting, but this is independent of the emissions level. 
 
Tournament audit mechanism. We now model N regulated firms in a peer group, 
which could represent an industry, geographical region, or other grouping. The regulator 
will audit k firms after receiving their disclosure reports. If audited, the situation is 
identical to that for the random audit mechanism, that is, firms face the cost in {.} in 
expression (1). We assume the regulator audits those firms that it believes have most 
greatly underreported their emissions, but that making such judgments is prone to 
significant error, which introduces randomness into the selection process. Specifically, 
we assume the regulator has expectations regarding the level of emissions for each firm 
i , which we denote ¯ei , representing the benchmark level of emissions against which a 
firm’s report will be judged. Firms do not know the true value of the regulator’s 
expectations, but believe them to be unbiased. From the firms’ perspective let ¯ei = ei + 
εi , with εi being an i.i.d. draw for each firm from the distribution G representing the 
regulator error in estimating firms’ probable emissions. We assume G is symmetrically 
distributed around zero. The regulator will audit the k firms for which the difference 
between expected and reported emissions, (¯ei − qi ), is greatest. As (¯ei − qi ) = (ei + 
εi ) − (zi + ei ) = (εi − zi ), this is equivalent to auditing the k firms forwhich (zi − εi ) is 
lowest. Define yi = zi − εi to be firmi’s error-adjusted compliance. 
 
The randomness we assume to be present in the regulator’s benchmarks reflects the 
reality that the firms in any peer group are likely to be highly heterogeneous, making 
relative evaluation problematic. For example, even if the firms operate similar 
production facilities, their actual emissions will of course differ, as will their emissions 
per unit of output. A regulator would nevertheless likely have some information on the 
relative scale of different firms and differences in production technologies and 
processes that would allow it to form expectations. We emphasize that the model does 
not require that a regulator can perfectly compare reports across myriad differentiated 
firms to determine which has exhibited the lowest level of compliance; in fact, the model 
relies on relative evaluation being problematic and prone to error. All that is necessary 
for the model to be representative in this regard is that comparison of reports across 
peer firms provides some information about which firms are likely to be most 
noncompliant. Put differently, the model simply assumes that, by choosing to audit 
those firms that stand out from their peers by disclosing low levels of emissions relative 
to expectations based on factors the regulator can observe, the regulator can achieve 
some correlation between the degree of noncompliance and the audit probability. 
 
Within the peer group, firms are identical with respect to the distribution from which 
errors in the regulator’s benchmark are drawn, G, and the distribution of errors in audits, 
F. Peer firms are also assumed to have identical regulatory cost parameters, α, β, and 
γ . This makes the firms symmetric competitors in the tournament game. Note that 
firms may differ in their actual emissions, ei . Because of this, symmetric behavior in 
which all firms choose an identical level of over-/underreporting may imply different 
levels of disclosure, qi . 
 
We will identify the symmetric equilibrium of a compliance tournament game. Let the 
probability a particular firm i is audited, which depends on its own report and that of all 
other firms, be denoted pi (zi , z−i ), where z−i denotes the common report of all other 
firms. For clarity, we first present this model for the case when the regulator only audits 
the firm with the lowest error-adjusted compliance, that is, k = 1, and then generalize it. 
For this case, we have 
 
(3)    
 
Of course, for any z−i , the probability i is audited decreases with zi : 
 
(4)   
As we are interested in the symmetric equilibrium of the game, the value of this 
expression when zi = z−i plays a critical role: 
 
(5)    
 
We can now consider the optimization problem for a particular firm i: 
 
(6)    
 
The first-order condition for minimizing expected cost is 
 
(7)   
 
We obtain the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game by evaluating (7) when zi 
= z−i . This gives us an expression that implicitly defines equilibrium disclosure in the 
tournament mechanism. We denote this expression V T : 
 
(8)   
 
To generalize the model for k ≥ 1 audits, we simply need to identify pi (zi , z−i ) and ∂ pi 
(zi ,z−i ) ∂zi for the general case. Here we follow Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), who 
identify the probability of a contestant ranking in each position within a general 
tournament. Let j denote player i’s rank up from the bottom (e.g., j = 1 denotes ranking 
last). Let pi j (zi , z−i ) be the probability player i ranks in exactly the jth position. This 
probability is 
 
 
 
The probability that i is audited is then 
 
     
 
From this we derive the effect of disclosure on the probability of a particular rank j at a 
symmetric point: 
 
  
 
The symmetric equilibrium effect of disclosure on the probability that i is audited is then 
 
     
 
With this result, equation (8) as stated above defines equilibrium disclosure in the 
tournament mechanism with k audits. 
 
Proposition 1. If an interior solution zT representing a symmetric equilibrium exists 
under the tournament audit mechanism, this solution entails higher disclosure than 
under random audits for identical values of α and β, and given equivalent audit 
probabilities, k/N = p. 
 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 is a central result that the competitive incentive generated by the 
tournament structure yields greater disclosure ceteris paribus. The marginal benefit of 
disclosure is increased by the tournament mechanism because it consists of both the 
reduction of the expected penalty conditional on being audited (the last term in (8)) and 
also the reduction in the probability of being audited. 
As is the case with random audits, disclosure increases with the penalty rate in the 
tournament mechanism, but this is now true both because a higher penalty makes 
losing the tournament and consequently being audited more costly and because the 
benefit of compliance arising from a lower expected fine conditional on being audited is 
larger. The comparative static with respect to the penalty is signed as follows: 
 
  
 
Because the disclosure choice affects the probability of being audited in the tournament 
mechanism, the greater the cost of being audited, γ , the greater the equilibrium level 
of disclosure, sign ∂zT ∂γ = −∂V T ∂γ = −( ∂ pi (zi ,z−i ) ∂zi |zi=z−i ) > 0. 
Equilibrium disclosure also increases as the marginal effect of disclosure on the 
probability of being audited in equilibrium, ∂ pi (zi ,z−i ) ∂zi |zi=z−i , increases. For a 
given distribution, this effect grows as the variance of the errors declines. In other 
words, the greater the noise, the weaker the leverage achieved by the tournament 
mechanism. However, as in all tournament models, sufficient variance of the errors is 
required for the existence of the pure-strategy equilibrium. These aspects of the role of 
noise in tournaments have been examined by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz (1983), and O’Keeffe et al. (1984). The effect of an increase in the number of 
competitors (or size of the peer group) N, 
 
 
 
is ambiguous because (holding the number of audits constant) this reduces the 
equilibrium audit probability for a firm (reducing the compliance incentive), but may 
increase the marginal effect of abatement on the probability of ranking last (i.e., it may 
increase the intensity of competition). The latter effect is complex, depending on the 
initial group size and on the error distribution (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983, discuss the 
effect of group size on tournaments). Because the marginal effect of abatement on the 
probability of ranking last is unaffected by N when errors are uniform, ∂( ∂ pi (zi ,z−i ) 
∂zi |zi =z−i )∂N= 0, this is a sufficient condition for an increase in N to reduce 
disclosure. However, from a regulator’s perspective, it is important to recognize the 
possibility that increasing the group size (holding the number of audits constant) can 
actually increase disclosure in some circumstances if the error distribution has a strong 
central tendency which causes the increased competitive effect to dominate the effect of 
a lower equilibrium audit probability. 
 
Compared to other rank-order tournament models ours is novel because although 
payoffs depend on rank, the expected payoff also varies conditional on rank as the 
expected penalty if audited falls with greater disclosure (compliance effort). Standard 
models assume payoffs are set in advance and depend solely on rank. Most 
tournament models are framed as competition to win (i.e., rank at the top), rather than 
to avoid ranking at the bottom, but this is not very critical to tournament theory. Its 
principal consequence, as Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) note, is that tournaments with 
penalties for ranking at the bottom rather than prizes for ranking at the top more easily 
satisfy the general incentive compatibility constraint, which is the condition that zero 
effort does not yield a higher payoff than playing the symmetric equilibrium when one’s 
competitors play the symmetric equilibrium. One concern in tournament settings is the 
possibility of collusion, which can occur in equilibrium if a tournament is repeated 
indefinitely and players are sufficiently patient. By colluding, players in a tournament 
reduce their effort levels (disclosure in our model) and are all better off than at the 
symmetric equilibrium of the one-shot game. Note, however, that the optimal collusive 
behavior by regulated firms in this context would be to behave exactly as though the 
audit process were random, so even perfect collusion would not imply zero compliance 
(unless pβ < α). Therefore, even if collusion undermined the leverage gained from this 
audit mechanism, it would never result in lower disclosure than with random 
enforcement. Although in an environment with heterogeneous players perfect collusion 
would be very difficult to achieve (requiring players to successfully coordinate), it 
remains an empirical question whether collusion would arise. 
 
Generalized relative evaluation audit mechanism. A tournament is one particular 
type of competitive mechanism, or relative performance evaluation, in which a fixed 
number of competitors are ranked according to performance on a specified metric with a 
specified number of prizes or penalties determined by rank. This structure fits our 
regulatory enforcement setting well if the size of the peer group is known to all firms and 
the audit capacity of the regulator is fixed. However, relative performance evaluation 
may still be used by a regulator when the size of a peer group is not clearly defined and 
the audit capacity of the regulator is unknown to firms. In this section, we consider a 
less structured and therefore somewhat more general model in which the regulator 
compares firms’ reports, and the probability a firm is audited is a function of how its 
report compares to the average of the other firms in the peer group. 
 
We assume that for any firm i the probability of being audited is a function of the 
difference between i’s report and its actual emissions, that is, zi , and the average of this 
difference among the other firms in the peer group. Define the average of i’s peers to be 
¯zi = _ z−I N−1 . The probability i is audited is then p(zi , z−i ) = P(¯zi − zi ). Note that in 
the tournament model, errors by the regulator in estimating firms’ emissions and 
establishing a benchmark for comparison of compliance were explicitly modelled. Here, 
the audit probability function P(¯zi − zi ) implicitly captures the same notion that the 
regulator has sufficient information to make a firm’s audit probability a decreasing 
function of its compliance relative to other firms, but errors in establishing benchmarks 
for comparison make this process imperfect so that it will not necessarily be the case 
that the least compliant firms are audited. 
 
We assume ∂ P ∂zi < 0 for values which place P on the interval (0,1). As with the 
tournament model, of particular importance is the point of symmetry where zi = z−i . We 
assume P(0) is strictly positive, so that in symmetric equilibrium each firm has a positive 
probability of being audited. 
 
The cost minimization problem for a firm in this context is very similar to that in the 
tournament model, with the form that p(zi , z−i ) takes being the only difference, so we 
simply state the condition for equilibrium disclosure: 
 
(9)   
 
Proposition 2. If an interior solution zGRE representing a symmetric equilibrium exists 
under the GRE audit mechanism, this solution entails higher disclosure than under 
random audits for identical values of α and β, and given equivalent equilibrium audit 
probabilities, p = P(0). The GRE and tournament mechanisms yield identical disclosure 
for identical values of α and β, given equivalent equilibrium audit probabilities, k/N = 
P(0), and given equal marginal effects of disclosure on the probability of being audited, 
∂ pi (zi ,z−i ) ∂zi |zi=z−I = ∂ P(0) ∂zi. 
 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 2 states that the GRE mechanism, like a tournament, achieves leverage 
relative to random audits by inducing competition to avoid being audited. Furthermore, if 
in equilibrium the marginal effect of a firm’s compliance effort on the audit probability 
and the audit probability itself are identical between a tournament and the GRE, then 
the two mechanisms yield equivalent equilibrium compliance (disclosure). It should be 
noted, however, that away from the symmetric equilibrium the two mechanisms may 
differ. In a tournament the marginal effect on the probability of being audited, ∂ pi (zi ,z
−i ) ∂zi , is not linear in its arguments and peaks at the symmetric point. Therefore, 
when firms are not behaving symmetrically, the competitive incentive is weakened. 
Although an equivalent, nonlinear audit function can be used as part of the GRE, 
marginal incentives can be manipulated. For example, if P(¯zi − zi ) is a linear function, 
then the mechanism maintains a constant marginal effect of compliance effort on a 
firm’s audit probability so long as a corner is not reached (with the audit probability 0 or 
1), so the competitive incentive is not weakened by asymmetric behavior among firms. 
Also, as discussed above, an important difference between these two competitive 
endogenous audit mechanisms is that the GRE mechanism is not sensitive to group 
size, N. Group size has no effect on the predicted equilibrium because it does not 
change either the equilibrium audit probability or the marginal effect of compliance 
effort. 
 
Applicability to enforcement of regulated actions. The competitive endogenous 
audit mechanisms we have developed are framed in an information disclosure 
framework; the regulated firm must disclose its performance, such as emissions 
released. Regulations stipulating actions such as pollution abatement are less clearly 
amenable to this type of enforcement, because they do not involve firms making a 
public signal (the report) to the regulator which can be used to condition audits. 
Nevertheless, the framework here can apply if the regulator can costlessly obtain some 
signal (however noisy) of firms’ relative compliance effort prior to choosing which firms 
to audit. For example, for some types of pollution regulations this could involve 
observing changes in ambient air or water quality in the vicinity of firms’ plants, or could 
simply involve being in contact with industry insiders who may have a sense of which 
firms are particularly focused on regulatory compliance and which are not. As we have 
discussed, competitive incentives arise whenever firms’ probability of being audited 
becomes conditional on their relative compliance effort, and this will occur if a regulator 
can in any way make the selection of firms for audit correlated with relative compliance 
effort. 
 
3. Experimental design 
The main objectives of the compliance experiment are to test the main comparative 
statics of the theory and examine the leverage gained through competitive endogenous 
audits. The experiment instructions use neutral framing (instructions included in 
Appendix B), but for ease of exposition we describe the experimental design and 
discuss results using the environmental disclosure context. The compliance experiment 
involves sessions of 20 players who participate in groups of N = 5 over two sequences 
of 20 decision periods. Players are randomly rematched into groups prior to each period 
to preserve as well as possible the incentives of the one-shot game while allowing for 
learning. The actual number of periods is undisclosed in order to minimize possible end-
of-game effects. In each period, players receive endowment E and produce a fixed 
amount of emissions (“actual output” in the experiment), e, of 20.6 The decision task for 
each player is to choose a level of disclosure (“reported output”), at a per-unit tax 
(“reporting cost”) of 1 experimental dollar, by selecting an integer between 0 and 40 
(inclusive). After all choices are made, one or more players are selected for audit 
(“inspection”). Players are made aware that, if audited, the process is imperfect in that it 
can reveal an emissions level that differs from their actual emissions of 20. 
 
Each player faces one of the three audit mechanisms discussed in the theory section: 
random audit, tournament audit, and GRE audit. Under random audit, players are 
randomly selected according to a specified probability (“chance”). For the tournament 
audit, the reports are error  
 
TABLE 1 Experiment Parameters 
 
 
adjusted (the “computer” makes an “initial estimate” of “actual output”) by adding to 
each disclosure report a mean-zero, i.i.d. draw from the uniform distribution with 
supports [−10, 10]. Then, the k player(s) in the group with the lowest error-adjusted 
report(s) is selected for audit. Note that with the distribution from which errors are drawn 
being uniform, the effect of disclosure on the audit probability is greatly simplified 
compared to the general case of k audits developed in Section 2. With uniformly 
distributed errors, only the probabilities of ranking first and last are affected by effort at a 
symmetric point; the probability of all intermediate ranks is unchanged. This in turn 
means the effect of effort on the probability of being audited is independent of k and 
equal to the effect of effort on the probability of ranking first, as stated in equation (5). 
 
Under the GRE mechanism, a player’s level of disclosure relative to the average of 
other group members determines the audit probability. In particular, the audit probability 
equals 
 
(11)    
 
This yields a symmetric equilibrium audit probability of P(0), and a marginal effect of 
disclosure on the probability of being audited in equilibrium of −1, which is consistent 
with the tournament mechanism. Information on the GRE mechanism is provided 
through an (simpler) equation, a “Chance of Inspection Table” (see Appendix B), which 
displays the audit probability associated with various possible disclosure outcomes, and 
descriptive text. 
 
For players selected for audit, they (possibly) pay a fixed audit cost (“inspection cost”). 
The audit is unbiased and reveals an estimate of emissions (“estimated output”) by 
adding to actual emissions a random variable, εi , which is i.i.d. uniform with supports  
−20, 20]. A penalty is levied on any (estimated) undisclosed emissions. The feedback 
given at the end of the decision period includes: (i) whether the player was audited, and 
if so estimated emissions; (ii) all relevant earnings calculations; and (iii) the disclosure 
reports of all group members and whether they were audited. 
 
Each of the two 20-period sequences involves a different parameter combination or 
“treatment.” Overall, there are eight treatments, which represents a full factorial of the 
following attributes: penalty (β = 1and β = 3); audit cost (γ = 0 and γ = 40/3); and 
(expected) audit probability (p = 0.2 and p = 0.6). Table 1 summarizes the design 
parameters of the experiment. The lone parameter that varies within session is the audit 
cost, and the order in which the two audit costs are encountered varied across sessions 
so that order effects can be sufficiently controlled for through statistical modelling.7,8 
For the tournament audit, given five-player groups, k = 1 and k = 3 are chosen in order 
to correspond to audit probabilities of 0.2 and 0.6. In the GRE sessions, the audit 
probabilities are attained by setting p = P(0). 
 
Testable hypotheses. The experimental design lends itself to testing the theory in 
several ways. First, six of the eight treatments represent cases where there is 
theoretically zero disclosure under random audits (given α > pβ), but nevertheless 
positive disclosure with the competitive endogenous audits. This thus provides a basis 
to explore the leverage afforded by competitive endogenous audits. Second, the GRE is 
parameterized to generate identical predictions to the tournament audit for each 
treatment. Third, common to related tax and environmental compliance experiments, 
the chosen audit probabilities are much larger than those in relevant, naturally occurring 
situations for purposes of transparency and saliency. For the competitive endogenous 
audit mechanisms, the predicted marginal effect of changing the probability from 20% to 
60% is an increase in the disclosure rate between 0.2 and 0.3.9 Fourth, in a similar 
vein, predicted disclosure rates for the competitive endogenous audit mechanisms 
range from 0.2 to 1.7. There are meaningful differences between any treatment pair, 
and predicted undercompliance, approximate compliance, and overcompliance. Fifth, 
the design allows us to test for equivalence between two components of the audit the 
regulator has control over: the penalty and audit cost. In particular, under competitive 
endogenous audits, the combination {β = 1, γ = 40/3} yields the same disclosure 
prediction as the combination {β = 3, γ = 0} for a given audit probability. The main 
hypotheses to be tested are summarized below  
 
Hypothesis 1. Competitive endogenous audits lead to higher disclosure than 
random audits. 
Hypothesis 2. Tournament and GRE audits generate equivalent disclosure. 
Hypothesis 3. Random audits: disclosure is invariant to audit cost. 
Hypothesis 4. Competitive endogenous audits: increasing the penalty, audit cost, 
or audit probability increases disclosure. 
Hypothesis 5. Competitive endogenous audits: increasing the penalty or audit 
cost has an equivalent effect on disclosure. 
 
Participant pool and procedures. Two hundred and forty undergraduate students at 
the University of Tennessee participated in the experiment during the spring of 2009. 
We conducted 12 sessions, and each session included 20 participants who played in 
two treatments of the same audit mechanism. Participants were drawn from a large pool 
of students who had previously registered to be potential participants in economics 
experiments. The participant pool is similar to the general undergraduate population of 
the university in terms of age, gender, and academic major. Experiments were 
conducted in a designated experimental laboratory. Participant earnings were 
denominated in experiment currency, which was exchanged for dollars at the end of the 
session at the known rate of 20 to $1 (U.S.). The experiment lasted approximately 90 
minutes and individual earnings averaged $26. 
 
Decisions were made via networked computers using software programmed with z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). The software collected all decisions and made earnings 
calculations. Written instructions were provided to each participant, which were read 
aloud by the same author in each session. To help facilitate learning, participants were 
then asked to work through three calculation questions (using pencil and paper) and 
were paid $1 for providing correct answers. The questions involved arbitrarily making a 
disclosure choice and then determining earnings under three audit outcomes. 
Experiment moderators privately checked the calculations and explained procedures in 
the case of wrong answers. Prior to paid decision periods, there were three practice 
periods. At the conclusion of the experiment, a short questionnaire was administered 
that included among other things an assessment of how well instructions were 
understood as well as demographic questions. 
 
4. Results 
Analysis of means. To facilitate tests of the hypotheses outlined above, we estimate a 
linear regression model of disclosure rates that allows identification of mechanism-
specific treatment main effects.10,11 As stated above, the only treatment variable that 
varied within subject is γ (audit cost). Simple examination of the raw data suggests 
prominent order effects as it pertains to this parameter. Further, there is evidence of 
learning. This is most evident in random-audit sessions with predicted disclosure rates 
of zero, as subjects tended to overreport relative to theoretical predictions and then 
decreased disclosure after repetition. Based on tests for structural breaks, this trending 
behavior flattens by period 15 for all treatments. 
 
Motivated by these observations, we control for learning and order effects in the 
econometric model. As a transparent control for learning, we estimate separate main 
effects for two period groupings, periods 1–15 and periods 16–20. We created six 
variables to control for order effects. These variables are interactions between an 
indicator variable, which equals 1 if a treatment was encountered in the second 
sequence in a session, with each treatment effect (High β, High γ , and High p) and 
with each mechanism. 
 
Formally, the treatment main-effects model is given by  
 
(11)
 
 
where ri j is the disclosure rate, that is, the share of emissions disclosed, for individual I 
in period j; I mn i j is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the disclosure rate 
corresponds to mechanism m and period grouping n and equals 0 otherwise, where n = 
1 denotes periods 1–15 and n = 2 denotes periods 16–20; High β, High γ , and High p 
are indicator variables that equal 1 to denote treatment parameters β = 3, γ = 40/3, 
and p = 0.6, respectively, and equal 0 otherwise; Ci j denotes the vector of control 
variables related to order effects; θ and ϕ are parameter vectors to be estimated; and 
ui j is a mean zero error term. 
 
To freely allow model errors to be autocorrelated and conditionally heteroskedastic for 
an individual, as well as to allow this error correlation to vary across all individuals, we 
use robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level (i.e., “cluster-
robust” standard errors) and associated robust test statistics. Errors across individuals 
and groups are assumed to be independent. This covariance estimator is a 
generalization of the oft-used heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimator of 
White (1980), and is similar to the Newey and West (1987) HAC covariance estimator 
except that all autocovariances particular to an individual are included and no kernel 
weighting function is used. Monte Carlo evidence suggests that test statistics based on 
this covariance estimator have the correct size for panel data with a moderate number 
of cross-sectional units under various data-generating processes (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan, 2004; Kezdi, 2004; Vossler, 2008). 
 
Table 2 presents selected estimation results, in particular the treatment main effects 
corresponding to the period grouping 16–20. Based on the estimated coefficients, we 
generated treatment-specific means for each mechanism and present these along with 
the Nash equilibria in Table 3 and Figure 1. Furthermore, Table 4 includes tests of 
treatment differences across mechanisms. These tests lead us to two of our main 
empirical results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 Treatment Main-Effects Model 
 
 
TABLE 3 Nash Equilibrium and Mean Disclosure Rate by Mechanism and 
Treatment 
 
 
Result 1. All comparative statics of the three audit mechanisms are confirmed. 
Result 2. (i) Disclosure rates with competitive endogenous audits are higher than 
with random audits. (ii) Furthermore, with little qualification, tournament and GRE 
audits lead to similar disclosure rates. 
 
Result 1 is directly evident from the estimated treatment main effects presented in Table 
2. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, in the random audit the marginal effect of increasing 
the audit cost from γ = 0 to γ = 40/3 on the disclosure rate is just 0.056, which is not 
statistically  
FIGURE 1 DISCLOSURE RATES BY MECHANISM AND TREATMENT 
 
 
TABLE 4 Difference of Means Tests; Difference of Variances Tests 
 
 
different from zero.14 For the competitive endogenous audit mechanisms, all treatment 
effects are positive and statistically significant, which confirms Hypothesis 4. Further, 
the marginal effects of the penalty and audit cost are similar in size and are statistically 
equivalent, consonant with Hypothesis 5: tournament audit (0.490 versus 0.453; p value 
= 0.55); GRE audit (0.311 versus 0.361; p value = 0.68). 
 
Result 2 is best illustrated with Figure 1. In particular, the mean disclosure rates are 
systematically higher with the competitive endogenous mechanisms under all treatment 
conditions. At the same time, the tournament and GRE audits have similar disclosure 
rates across treatment conditions. The ocular patterns are verified with the statistical 
tests presented in Table 4. In all cases, estimated mean disclosure rates are statistically 
higher for the competitive endogenous mechanisms relative to random audits. Further, 
although there is a tendency for tournament audits to motivate lower disclosure levels 
under low and moderate treatment conditions, and higher relative disclosure under 
more draconian parameters, under all treatment conditions the two competitive 
endogenous audit mechanisms lead to statistically identical disclosure rates with the 
exception of {β = 1, γ = 0, p = 0.2}. 
 
Result 3. For all audit mechanisms, when predicted disclosure rates are less than 1, 
there is a tendency of overcompliance; otherwise, when predicted disclosure rates are 
equal to or greater than 1, there is undercompliance. 
 
In experimental tax compliance studies, under design conditions that lead to theoretical 
predictions of less than 100% compliance, compliance rates above those predicted by 
theory have been widely observed (e.g., Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992). To the 
best of our knowledge, no related study on compliance has examined conditions under 
which theory predicts perfect compliance or overcompliance. As seen in Figure 1 and 
supported by statistical tests, in all such cases estimated disclosure rates are 
statistically different from predicted and are substantially less. Thus, although too much 
disclosure—under theoretical conditions of undercompliance— may be supported by 
social norms or the overweighting of small probabilities (Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 
1992), these or other factors seemingly lead to less than predicted disclosure under 
conditions that should lead to exact or overreporting.  
 
Analysis of variances. In laboratory experiments involving tournaments, a common 
finding is that there is a large variance in individual-level decisions relative to other 
incentive mechanisms such as piece rates and collective compensation schemes (e.g., 
Bull, Schotter, andWeigelt, 1987; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; van Dijk, Sonnemans, 
and van Winden, 2001). As discussed in this literature, this may be due to the presence 
of strategic incentives in tournaments as well as increased computational difficulty. 
There are similar considerations when comparing random audits with the competitive 
endogenous mechanisms. To explore this issue, we estimate the model defined by (11) 
but using instead as the dependent variable the squared deviation from the mean 
disclosure rate, that is, (ri j − ¯r j )2, where ¯r j is the treatment-specific mean in period j 
. Thus, a measure of zero suggests that all players in a particular treatment made the 
same decision. 
 
The last three columns in Table 4 present pairwise tests of equal variances. In just 1 of 
the 16 comparisons (Treatment 3, tournament), we find that the variance is significantly 
different and lower with random audits. In fact, in 9 cases, random-audit mechanisms 
are associated with a higher variance in disclosure rates.15 To give these results some 
perspective, across all treatments, the random audit variance is 2.2 times that of 
tournament audits and 1.4 times that of the GRE. Thus, the general finding is that, in 
contrast to experimental findings from related studies, the competitive incentives 
introduced by the endogenous audit mechanisms actually lead to relatively lower 
variance in choices. Although the underlying mechanism for the disparity is not clear, it 
may be due to a difference in framing, that is, in the regulation setting, firms are 
competing not to lose rather than competing to win.  
 
These findings are especially strong given that the comparisons are biased toward 
finding lower variance with random audits. This is because random audits generate 
lower disclosure— recall that predicted disclosure is zero in six of eight treatments—and 
players are hence constrained from disclosing amounts that are significantly less than 
average, as negative disclosure is not possible. 
 
We further find that in half of the cases, the variance from the tournament mechanism is 
higher than the GRE, and this result goes in the opposite direction for Treatment 4. This 
weak evidence is consistent with the marginal compliance incentives when players act 
asymmetrically. In particular, as noted in the theory section, the GRE mechanism 
maintains a constant marginal effect of compliance effort on a firm’s audit probability, 
whereas the tournament has nonlinear marginal incentives that are their highest at the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
 
Robustness checks. To evaluate the robustness of our results, we undertook 
additional analyses using the disclosure and disclosure variance data. In the first set of 
checks, using the same data set, we estimate three alternative models: one that only 
controls for order effects; one that only controls for learning effects; and a third that 
controls for neither, that is, a regression on treatment-specific indicator variables. For 
analyses of disclosure rates, with very slight qualifications, our main results hold based 
on these models. The qualifications are that Results 2(i) and 2(ii) only continue to hold 
on average (i.e., if we pool disclosure rates across treatments for a mechanism), but do 
not always hold when comparing across mechanisms on a treatment-by-treatment 
basis. 
 
In the case of Result 2(i), this no longer holds for only Treatment 2, where for the 
random-audit mechanism we observed the sharpest time trend (toward zero). Turning to 
the analysis of the variance of disclosure rates, the comparison between competitive 
endogenous audits and random audits is virtually unaffected. However, the systematic 
differences between tournament and GRE variances become much less pronounced, 
and in the vast majority of cases we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal variances. 
 
As an additional robustness check, we estimated the models while restricting the data to 
include only those treatments that appeared as a first sequence in a session. This 
avoids completely the issue of order effects. Further, controls for learning effects were 
excluded. With this subset of the data, we continue to confirm the comparative statics 
results and find that the competitive endogenous audit mechanisms yield higher 
disclosure rates. Further, in 9 out of 16 cases, we find a lower variance in competitive 
endogenous audit mechanisms relative to random audits (and null effects in the 
remaining cases). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The models developed here show that if a regulator evaluates firms’ relative disclosure 
when selecting firms for audit, in an environment where both the selection process and 
the audits themselves are subject to errors, this naturally generates competition in 
compliance effort among regulated firms. Compliance effort reduces both a firm’s 
expected penalty, conditional on being audited, and the probability that the firm will be 
audited. As our experimental results confirm, the addition of this second incentive can 
be quite powerful, especially when the cost of being audited is significant. 
 
It is informative to compare the competitive endogenous audit mechanisms described 
here with the targeting framework developed by Harrington (1988) and others which 
conditions a firm’s audit probability on past compliance rather than as a signal of relative 
current compliance effort. The targeting framework does not depend on a regulator 
having a contemporaneous signal of firms’ relative compliance effort as do our models, 
and such a signal may be unobtainable in enforcement of mandated actions. However, 
targeting has some significant disadvantages. In particular, by its nature, similar firms 
(typically modelled as identical) are at any moment in time subject to differing audit 
probabilities, and thus choose different compliance efforts. In the dichotomous 
framework, this essentially means that leverage is achieved when only those firms that 
are targeted in any given period actually comply, whereas nontargeted firms do not 
comply. This does a poor job of explaining the stylized fact that most firms are compliant 
most of the time, and is not very satisfactory as prescriptive policy as it implies that 
targeting is effective only in circumstances when noncompliance by most firms at any 
given time is acceptable. Similarly, if compliance effort is a continuous rather than a 
dichotomous choice, targeting results in much higher compliance effort among targeted 
firms. This is inherently inefficient, given standard assumptions about the convexity of 
the cost of compliance effort that imply that the costs of achieving any given level of 
aggregate industry compliance are minimized by equalizing compliance effort among 
firms. 
 
An important advantage of the competitive endogenous audit mechanisms we have 
developed is that they achieve leverage relative to random audits without dividing firms 
into groups with different enforcement intensity and compliance incentives. Both 
targeting and competitive endogenous auditing use the cost of being audited to 
leverage enforcement by making the probability this cost is incurred dependent on firms’ 
behavior. However, the competitive endogenous audit mechanisms apply enforcement 
“pressure” uniformly across all firms. 
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